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ABSTRAC T
In this article, which has not been published before, the late Prof. du Plessis 
lays bare the philosophical roots o f  the liberal-democratic state, or the legal 
state, as het preferred to call it. A fter a recapitulative version o f  the theory o f  
the legal state, het indicates the origin o f  this form  in Greek philosophy and 
in Medieval thought. The stress, however, is on the M odem Era, in which he 
distinuishes two main periods in the development o f the theory o f  the legal 
state:
* the jusnaturalistic period and the
* positivistic or formal period.
He argues that positivism has destroyed the original ideal o f  individual freedom  
in facts by regarding justice as a purely formal matter susceptible to any content. 
A ll guarantees for individual freedom which rested on a universal normative 
system fe ll away. The state defines its own competence and limits itself to 
legal forms in all its activities. The legal state thus merely becomes the state, 
any state as determined by fixed  rules o f its own making to which it binds it­
self in all its functioning. Law sinks to a mere form  in which the juristic persona­
lity o f  the state manifests its supremacy, and from  this there is only one step to 
the concept that the state is identical with law, so that any state necessarily is 
a legal state, and any state action which is formally correct, is legal. The article 
concludes with a brief representation o f the author’s own political and legal 
vision.
GENERAL
His torically this theory represents a reaction to  arbibrary rule in certain well- 
defined forms and at the present day it is especially em bodied in the liberal- 
dem ocratic state which is being threatened by  the so-called dictatorships of 
international and national socialism as the modern em bodim ents o f arbitra­
ry rule.
The theory  o f the legal state posits:
* Legislation with continuous consent o f a popular representation dem o­
cratically elected.
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* Application of the law by a politically independent and expert judica­
ture.
* Strict legal circumscription of the powers of executive government and 
adm inistration, especially excluding powers of legislation and judicial 
decision.
* Subjugation o f all executive officers to  the jurisdiction of the law courts.
* Delimitation of state functions in a fundam ental law of a relatively 
inflexible character.
* Reservation of certain civil liberties from  encroachm ent by government, 
either in a fundam ental law or in common law.
The theory has a history starting from its origins in classical times, developing 
through a jusnaturalistic, mainly material, and a constitutional, mainly formal, 
period to  its decline in the formalistic positivism of extrem e democratism.
It divides into two clearly separated currents in its second period of develop­
m ent, viz th a t o f Anglo-Saxon rule o f law and of continental legal state theory.
ORIGINS
In a sense of course every state and the state as such is a legal state as being 
always determ ined by law and operating through legal categories, which does 
not mean th a t state and law are necessarily indentical as Kelsen maintains. But 
the theory of the legal state is not meant to  be applicable to  every state but 
only to  a special historically developed kind or form o f state, viz that indi­
cated in the first section of this essay, the so-called demo-liberal state. As such 
it takes its origin from  classical quasi-democratic theory.
The material aspect o f  the theory is fore-shadowed in Plato’s and A ristotle’s 
political ideal o f government according to  nature, which means according 
to the perfect essence of human virtue in society, tha t is to  say according to 
the law of nature as later on developed in Stoic theory, the law o f reason and 
equality and equity, as finally embodied in Roman private law. This material - 
legal basis o f the state is not, however, conceived as lim iting the power of 
the state or o f government, rather it is described as the natural content of 
the ideal state and of good government and law, at least as far as concerns 
the relations between the citizens and the education of citizens.
The formal aspect o f the theory can also be traced to  the teachings of Pla­
to  and Aristotle in so far as they considered the safest form  of government
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to  be one according to law, that is to  say according to  custom  and legislation 
by a more or less popular body standing above the law courts and the adm i­
nistration. (Law in this sense was crystallized in Rom an private law.) Mean­
while the contract theory as explanation of the basis of state au thority  had 
been m ooted by the Epicureans and this also tended in the direction of bind­
ing governm ent to  popular consent in legal form.
All this referred more especially to  legislation on private law. Public law it­
self was kept separate and was considered as being more freely at the dispo­
sal o f government. This was changed by the advent o f Christendom  which 
in principle limited the power of the state to  so-called secular m atters and 
also bound public law to the law o f God and nature as interpreted by the 
Church, which thus became the supreme arbiter o f law, public and private. This 
brings us to  the Middle Age, in which certain classical hints as to  
the natural basis o f specific social groups as distinguished from  the individuals 
and the state (and church) were developed under the influence of Christian 
doctrine and Germanic custom  into a theory  of the legal autonom y of cor­
porations in the forms of guilds, municipalities and social orders (ordines). 
Even now the individual had not come into his right in as much as classical 
theory  entirely subordinated him to the state and public law though it be 
in a position of relative equality with o ther individuals, while medieval theo­
ry kept him in subjugation to  a variety o f  authorities, ecclesiastical, politi­
cal, social etc.
The most characteristic feature of medieval theory  is its concept o f a com­
plete system of divine and natural law which shapes and determ ines human 
society as it were from  above, a law derived from  the will o f God and natu­
ral reason . This system of law is considered to  be the essence of positive law 
as laid down and adopted to  changing human circumstances by the au thori­
ties o f the church and the state and various autonom ous communities.
The church is the highest au thority  but is in essencc confined to  the domain 
of grace, the state dom inates the lower natural sphere of life and the head 
of the state, while subordinate to divine and natural law, is the supreme dis­
penser of positive law.
If, however, the state deviates from  divine and natural law in laying down 
and administering positive law, it in so far forfeits its authority , and all sub­
jects may be absolved from  obedience by the church. This higher law thus
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is the material basis o f the legal state in medieval times and it is considered 
as definitely limiting the authority of the state in public and in private law.
Formally the legality o f state action is guaranteed by the more or less con­
tractual relation amongst the hierarchy o f authorities above and below the 
state, which has as a consequence that im portant state action requires the 
concurrence of these o ther authorities and observance of the general feudal 
contracts between them, which may be enforced even by armed conflict, in 
as much as the state does not have the monopoly of force in medieval times, 
the several social organisations still being largely undifferentiated, the essen­
tially economic guilds e.g. having im portant cultural, religious, fisical, mili­
tary and legislative functions as well, etc etc.
A t the end o f the Middle Ages this medieval system is being undermined by 
nascent individualism and nationalism. Now the idea arises tha t the funda­
mental fact o f nature is not a universal system of will and reason and law, 
but the free individual as a centre of independent will and sovereign reason 
in himself. So natural law becomes the product of the individual will, which 
is saved from  choas by a national unification of the individual wills in the 
state, which then becomes the com ponent o f the individual wills by free con­
sent and social com pact, authorized by these wills to  lay down the positive 
law to  the advantage of the combined individuals. The freedom of the indi­
vidual will generates the sovereignty of the national will, and the problem 
arises how to guarantee materially the jusnaturalistic content of the positive 
law as product o f the sovereign will and how formally to  organize the sover­
eign will so as to  ensure the legality o f its actions.
The Reform ation did not have much trouble with this problem as it main­
tained the ideal o f natural legal principles o f all positive law embodied by 
the Creator in Scripture and in the natural constitution of human society, 
while discarding the supremacy of the church, and moreover in its Calvinis- 
tic  form, which was the cause of modern parliamentary institutions, recog­
nized the legal com petence of all natural and historical social organizations, 
o f each according to  its own nature, thus formally ensuring legality by the 
requirem ent o f co-operation between the state and these other organizations 
as represented in parliamentary institutions. But modern theory while dissolving 
human society into sovereign individuals felt the full impact o f this problem.
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The suinaturalistic period
The first solution of this problem was offered by the so-called classical or 
jusnaturalistic theory of the law of nature as the basis of society and the state, 
the law of nature namely in its modem humanistic conception as the rational 
rule of liberty of the individual man.
At first theorists were content to  base the sovereign will on an original com­
pact o f the individuals to  subject themselves to  one with a view to securing 
law and order or the general good, and further all emphasis was laid on the 
unity and indivisibility and absoluteness of sovereignty as the supreme source 
of all positive law. This was the line taken by Bodin and Grotius, who, how­
ever, at the same time maintained the regulative force of the law of nature. 
Thomas Hobbes, however, who conceived o f the law of nature as one of chaos 
and barbarity, took the view that the founding of society and the sovereign 
state person put an end to  the rule of natural law, so that positive law is the 
original and free product o f the sovereign will unfettered by any rule of na­
ture.
Now this theory was so strongly opposed to  the facts of the British consti­
tu tion  in which a rule of law more or less independent of the sovereign will 
had always been recognized, and moreover so unfavourable to  the 17th cen­
tury opposition to  start absolutism, tha t it found much less support in Eng­
land than on the continent o f Europe.
The English common law and non-conform ist reaction against the Hobbesian 
absolutism was further strengthened by the rise in philosophy of a less ratio­
nalistic current o f thought which found in nature as empirical substratum  
not soluble into rational concepts and accordingly refused to  allow the indi­
vidual to  be absorbed and submerged in a rationalistic system of artificially 
constructed sovereignty.
In this view the free individual is a perm anent datum  of nature, and natural 
law is preserved as the basis of the state so tha t sovereignty, while being ba­
sed on the contractual unification of the individual wills into society, never­
theless remains bound to  the original purpose of its institution viz the more 
effective m aintenance of individual liberty. Thuswise the jusnaturalistic con­
te n t o f positive law as product o f the sovereign will is materially guaranteed. 
The free individuals o f the state o f nature bind themselves by contract which 
is an institution of the law of nature (pacta sunt servanda), to  unify their ge- 
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neral forces into civil society for the purpose of protecting the individual li­
berty  of each by means of positive law, If therefore this purpose is not achieved 
the individual is absolved from  his conditional contract. Nevertheless it 
is also conceded th a t the sovereign has to  be guided by the common good 
and the conflict between common good and individual liberty is not resolved: 
the sanctioning of revolution carries with it the constant threat o f anarchy.
This theory also attacked the second part of the problem, viz how formally 
to  organize the sovereign will so as to  ensure the legality of its actions. This 
was done in the main by entrusting the wielding (execution) o f the sovereign 
power to  several distinct authorities which could mutually check one another 
and especially by reserving the most im portant power viz the legislative to  
the representative body or paliament which could be supposed to  reflect the 
public will o f society and to  be powerful enough to  make this will effective 
as against the o ther authorities in the state in the form  of sta tu te  law. The 
difficulty of course remaining tha t the representative body may be falsified 
or frustrated or th a t a deadlock may result; and in any case there is no guaran­
tee tha t even the representative body will always be m inded to  guarantee in­
dividual liberty. In fact a fully dem ocratic sovereign may be most tyranni­
cal against liberal liberty.
In any case this dem ocratic representative constitution is pictured not only 
as the  historic safeguard of liberty in England but as a postulate of the jus- 
naturalistic theory of individual liberty and in both its material and its formal 
aspects it is a developm ent o f suggestions thrown out by a whole series of 
late medieval theorists between the 14th and 15th centuries o f whom the most 
im portant is Marsilius o f  Padua.
The classical exponents o f the theory, however, are John Locke, Baron de 
M ontesquitu and Jean Jacques Rousseau. Their relevant works should if pos­
sible be read and summ arized in this connection.
Finally the jusnaturalistic period is concluded by a moralistic reinterpretation 
in idealistic vein on the continent by Kant, F ichte and H um boldt, and in 
utilitarian strain by Hume.Betham and Mill in England.
While maintaining the above outlined criticism of this theory as a whole its 
special merit must at the same time be underlined, in tha t it brought to  the 
fore the unique value of the individual also in social and political relations 
not only in reference to  the sphere o f private law as in the Roman, ius 
gentium  bu t in the domain o f public law as well.
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John Locke who was educated in a nonconform ist home and was by convic­
tion an em piristic rationalist, published his political theory in his Two Trea­
tises of Govt. (1690) directed against Film er and Hobbes and in favour of 
the Glorious Revolution in England.
The general outline of his theory is sufficiently known and need not be re­
peated. The following six salient points, however, require notice. Just as the 
material o f knowledge is derived from  the individual sensations and reflec­
tions and only the relations between these are rationally determ ined, so the 
material o f natural law is provided by individual property (in the special Lockian 
sence) and only the social protection of property, based on the jusnaturalis- 
tic  social contract, is a m atter for positive law. The material purpose of the 
social contract is none other than organized protection of the inborn natu­
ral human rights o f the individual, term ed by Locke his property. Y et by an 
intelligible anomaly the state is also required to  ensure the public welfare the 
m otto  of his work actually is: Salus popul suprema lex esto. Locke’s own 
definition combines these divergent purposes of the state into one seeming­
ly harm onious whole (I. i. in fine): “ Political power, then, 1 take to  be a right 
o f making laws with penalty o f death, and consequently all less penalties, 
for the regulating and preserving o f property, and o f em ploying the force of 
the com m unity, in the execution o f such laws, and in the defence of the com ­
m onwealth from  foreign injury, and all this only for the common good” .
By property is understood life, health, freedom  and material goods o f the 
individual and all together are also styled liberty which was defined form al­
ly by Locke as follows (11 ): “ Freedom  o f men under government is, to  have 
a standing rule to  live by, common to every one of tha t society, and made 
by the legislative power erected in it; a liberty to  follow my own will in all 
things, where the rule prescribes not; and no t to  be subject to the inconstant 
uncertain unknow n, arbitrary will o f another man: as freedom  o f nature is 
to  be under no o ther restraint but the law o f  nature” .
The elements o f this formal legality o f the free state clearly are: legal cer­
ta in ty , equality before the law, separation of powers, popular consent to  le­
gislation, absence of other than legal restraint and o f arbitrary rule - no one 
o f which, however, is a guarantee for the material right o f property.
The formal ideal is clearly and succinctly stated by Locke himself in the fol­
lowing words: “ And so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any
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com monwealth, is bound to  govern by established standing laws, promulga­
ted and known to  the people, and not by extem porary decrees, by indifferent 
and upright judges, who are to  decide controversies by those laws; and to  em­
ploy the force of the com m unity at home, only in the execution of such laws” .
The legislature is constituted indirectly by the majority of the people, it is 
the supreme power, however, constituted, and yet as delegated by the people 
has no power further to  delegate its legislative power. The legislative body 
ought only to  m eet interm ittently for the passing of laws and ought not to 
execute the laws, so tha t the legislators may live under the laws passed by 
themselves and thus be careful to  frame laws for the common good. The ex­
ecutive body on the o ther hand, while subordinate to  the legislative, functions 
continously in as much as the laws require continuous execution. A separate 
power no t regulated by the laws, while also usually entrusted to the executive 
body, is th a t for the management o f external affairs, called the federative 
power, which is determ ined by the law of nature and seems to  point to  the 
prerogative powers of the British monarchy. (N.B.: The judicature is not spe­
cially m entioned in this connection as a separate power, and in the question 
above it is closely affiliated to  the legislative power.)
It must be noticed tha t the legislature as once constituted by the commu­
nity cannot be changed w ithout overthrowing the existing state by revolution. 
Thus Locke’s theory does not envisage any reform ation of the constitution 
of the British legislature (ro tton  boroughs etc ), yet he has no objection to 
allowing the executive by prerogative to  reorganize the representation in par­
liament, which is an obvious anomaly; other prerogative powers are justified 
as remnants of a period o f greater popular trust in rulers. These could be li­
mited by the legislature as a whole .
The last resort is the appeal to  heaven, that is to  say revolution and recon­
stitu tion  of the state by society. In that case, however, the executive really 
is the primary rebel in breaking the basic covenant and so reopening the con­
flict (rebellare) and then as Locke expresses it: “ every one is at the disposure 
of his own will, when those who had, by the delegation of the society, the 
declaring of the public will, are excluded from  it and others usurp the place, 
who have no such authority  or delegation” . In the last resort therefore the 
formal guarantee of individual liberty against the reason of state disguised 
as the com mon good is not the legislature or the separation of powers but 
revolution of the massed individuals. Because society is not viewed as materially
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defined and articulated but as formally constructed by means of a compact 
o f free individuals, for the common good, the material liberty of the indivi­
duals and society cannot be formally guaranteed by a constitution which must 
continuously waver in unstable equilibrium between individual liberty and 
social good. Nevertheless Locke had succeeded in rasing the standard of indi­
vidual liberty against the supreme power o f the state in private and in public 
law.
The famous French theorist o f the legal state Charles de Secondat, baron 
de M ontesquieu, De 1’ Esprit des Lois is even more empiristically enclined than 
Locke and lays special emphasis on the necessity of a liberal constitution as 
a guarantee of individual liberty.
The constitution of the state he then analysis as determ ined by a variety of 
causes, but as a guarantee of liberty he fixes on a constitution on the model 
o f that o f England and especially characterized by a separation of powers 
with a view to mutual lim itation o f powers, so tha t the balance of the seve­
ral powers of government while reducing the danger o f tyrannical criminal 
legislation and execution conduces to  the m aintenance o f individual civiL 
liberty - the form of the political constitution thus guaranteeing the material 
of civil liberty, which is natural right. And yet civil liberty is defined w ith­
out relation to  natural liberty as the power to  do what the laws require one 
to  wish for and the absence of being forced to  do w hat the laws forbid one 
to  strive for. Liberty already tends to  become absorbed into legalism, the ma­
terial into the formal, as even more clearly evident in the teachings of Rous­
seau. Montesquieu, however, considers liberty as only one of the possible ends 
o f the state as e g in England; the liberal constitution then is tha t one in which 
legislative and executive power are separated, while the legilative power, though 
not absolutely supreme, yet represents the people as a united whole; in such 
a constitution further the executive is separated into two, the one governed 
mainly by international law (Locke’s federative power including part of Locke’s 
executive power) and the other the power o f judicature evidently governed 
by municipal law. The lawgiver must only legislate, so as not to  be interested 
in the execution of the law, the executive only execute so as to  be restricted 
in its use of power by the executed law and the judge only interpret fixed 
law so as to  be bound by law not o f his own making and to  be forced to  leave 
the execution of his sentences to  the executive, etc.
In fact the formal law must be the ruling power in state and the law must 
be the embodied will o f a true representative legislature, representing the people
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as a whole on the basis o f a vote for every normal adult citizen. Yet M ontes­
quieu makes a variety of concessions to  the necessities o f  historical develop­
ment and human weakness, allowing e g a veto power o f the executive in law­
making and a power of arresting and imprisoning suspected persons in time 
of emergency, as well as several aristocratic privileges.
In these several concessions the fundam ental dualism in M ontesquieu’s con­
ception is revealed, viz th a t between the civil state as the union o f  individual 
wills and the  political state as consisting o f the combined force o f the commu­
nity as wielded by the government. Nevertheless as m odified by practice in 
the direction o f allowing w ider political power to  the  executive in a broad 
sense the theory  of M ontesquieu as combined with th a t o f Locke had a pro­
found influence in shaping the political constitution o f  the western world, 
especially in the United States in the general direction o f a representative le­
gislature and independent judicial control over the independent executive 
power.
Meanwhile the theory o f empirism had advanced so far through the critiques 
of David Hume th a t reason had been reduced to  a association of sensual im­
pressions and now the ideal o f  human liberty and sovereignty veered round 
to  the level of feeling and will. Jean Jacques Rousseau was the great prophet 
of the new human freedom as guaranteed by the consciousness or feeling o f 
liberty to  choose amongst several possible alternatives w ithout constraint by 
natural law or even the laws of reason. In fact Hume had already denied the 
existence o f reasonable law in a state o f  nature.
Rousseau then makes it his task no t so much to  explain the rise of the state 
as to  revolutionize the constitution of the state so as to  bring it in to  harmo­
ny with the natural human liberty of selfdeterm ination by free choice. For 
this purpose he uses the traditional ideology of the “ contract social” bu t gives 
it a new content, in th a t it is conceived by him as a m ethod for creating an 
infallible unified general will out o f a multiplicity of particularistic individual 
wills which maintain their liberty by being combined into one. This general 
will is then declared am nipotent as being the essence of human perfection 
and so is com petent to  force recalcitrant individuals to  be free. Against its 
supremacy all natural law or scientific reason breaks down and the only gua­
rantee as to  its hum anity or essential justice is the formal m ethod o f  its self- 
expression viz by means of a universal meeting of the people to  declare the 
law, and the com plete subordination o f the executive power to  this legal will -
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in fact, however, the guarantee against the arbitrariness of the supreme will 
is its sublimation into ideal justice. And in principle it is indeed sublimated 
in as much as it is conceived as a kind o f ideal unity of the individual wills, 
as the true will o f every individual although it may be at complete variance 
with his actual will, as the expression of the perfect human being which results 
from  the transform ation of natural man into a citizen by means of the social 
com pact and under the influence of some semidivine original lawgiver. Even 
as the more concrete general will which issues into legislation of an illimita­
ble, indivisible, inalienable sovereignty, in as much as the particular wills of 
the people (excluding the always particularistic women) gathered in direct, 
general assembly for legislation proceeding from all and directed to  the equal 
and common good o f all, cancel their mutual particularity and become uni­
versalized into unity, even as such the supreme power still remains fairly at­
tenuated. But when Rousseau proceeds for practical purposes to  introduce 
the principle o f m ajority vote as determining legislation, we have the Leviathan 
naked and undisguised into which all natural liberty of the individual is ab­
sorbed, although in this case the Leviathan is not the government as repre­
senting the body politic but the massed individual citizens themselves expres­
sing their m ajority will which cannot be represented in any way. Goverment 
then is only execution of the so expressed popular will by agents who can 
at any tim e be discharged, and the adm inistration of justice simply the appli­
cation of this law. These are no separate powers any more, but only subor­
dinate and particulirized applications of the only sovereign will, tha t o f the 
legislature which is the unity o f the wills of all the citizens and as such the 
true em bodim ent o f liberty in which each individual has become “ comme 
Partie indivisible du to u t” .
So, while Locke raised the standard o f  individual natural liberty as a right 
against the governmental power, thus differentating the ideal of private law 
or civil law as the guarantee of right to  the private person as such and Mon­
tesquieu sought a guarantee of civil liberty in the constitution itself, Rous­
seau proclaimed as the true and only basis of the civil law o f liberty that o r­
ganization of public law which ensures its being the direct expression of the 
general will o f all the people as directed to  the equal good o f all - liberty re­
sulting from  equality before the law and this being based on universal equa­
lity in the making of the law, the idea o f public law, thus being differentiated as 
the expression of the identity o f will for public purposes generated in a 
com m unity of free private persons w ithout aristocratic privilege or any sectional 
organization,
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The construction of public law is now to serve as the guarantee of individual 
human liberty and so the material idea of individual liberty as purpose of 
the legal state recedes into the background and the scene is held by the more 
formal idea of a truly dem ocratic constitution where law rules as being the 
general will. In fact these ideas are mutually exclusive as shown by 
Rousseau’s phrase “ to  be forced to  be free” and y e t they are still combined in the 
w ritten constitutions of the revolutionary period in France as if in com plete mu­
tual harmony. Actually the Leviathan emerged supreme from  the conflict 
in Napoleon and yet one of the belated results was the code o f civil law and 
another the judicial defence of private legal right in administrative law against 
encroachm ents by administrative officials of the executive power, which means 
tha t the ideal of individual liberty had in fact been realized in a rather 
circumscribed sphere.
By this tim e then, that is the last quarter of the 18th century, the doctrine 
o f natural law and right had fulfilled its function in generating the ideas of 
liberty through popular; sovereignty, supremacy of law, equality before the law 
and subordination o f the executive power to  law and the legislature. So the stage 
was set for the second period o f the legal state theory in which the jusnaturalis- 
tic material aspect was superseded by the constitutional formal aspect, which 
change o f accent was philosophically advanced by the victory o f empirism 
in England through the labour of Hume and the rise o f historicism on the 
continent. Law now come to be looked upon not as an em bodim ent o f na­
tural right but rather as the will o f the (popular) sovereign-jusnaturalism  wa; 
being replaced by dem ocratic positivism. And the emphasis now is on the 
constitutional improvement o f  the expression o f  the popular will.
The abruptness o f this change was, however, softened by the intervention 
o f a period of speculation on the etnical (vide jusnaturalistic or legal) limi­
tations o f the sovereign will. In this period of transform ation there was a clear 
distinction between the utilitarian English theory into produced by Jere­
my Bentham and the idealistic German theory proceeding from  Immanuel 
Kant
In fact from  now on there is a distinct clearage between English and German 
thought, which is maintained into the second period of the theory of the legal 
state.
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English demo-liberal thought now bases itself on the common sense ethical 
concept o f  “ the greatest happiness of the greatest num ber”and from  this con­
cludes1 tha t the state should leave the individual to  his own devices as much 
as possible and direct its public actions by the ideal o f humanitarianism and 
organize itself on the lines o f dem ocratic parliamentary sovereignty and the 
rule of law as expounded by independent law courts with a bias in favour 
of the defence o f private right against administrative arbitrariness in public 
law, a bias which in America was embodied in the w ritten constitutions and 
reinforced by an extrem e separation o f powers.
This theory finally issues into the rule of law theory as expounded by Dicey 
This has already been briefly dicussed and we shall now proceed to  a discus­
sion o f  the continental theory o f the legal state in the second period, prefa­
cing a few remarks on the idealistic '.liberalism of Kant, which is the ethical 
basis o f  this theory.
Kant proceeds from  the idea tha t the hum anity o f man is unassailably gua­
ranteed only in the autonom y of the individual will as the perm anent ethical 
idea of individual selfdeterm ination according to the categorical imperative 
of always acting so th a t the rule o f this action can be conceived as a univer­
sal law. This absolutely excludes the determ ination of the will by any other 
will or by any force outside the will, especially by any factor o f natural cau­
sation. The rationalistic schematisation of reality which was the ideal o f ra­
tionalism up to  now, had threatened to  engulf human liberty in the dark cur­
rent o f causation, and this danger had to  be cut off a t the root by elevating the 
human will as the idea o f liberty ou t o f this causal concatenation. But 
now the coexistence of many individuals necessitates the mutual lim itation 
of the liberty of individuals which is the idea o f right, o f which the ideal prin­
ciple is a form  o f association in which the freedom of choice o f one indivi­
dual can coexist with th a t of all others. From  this is deduced the ideal o f the 
(relatively) dem ocratic state and o f positive law as the rule o f hindrance of 
hindrances, and o f international society as th a t o f a dem ocratic league o f  nations 
tending towards the establishment o f eternal peaces Peace however requires 
supremacy of power which at least outwardly destroys individual liberty of 
choice - as even K antw as forced to  adm it.
The supremacy of political power in laying down positive law is according­
ly now an accepted tend and idealistic liberalism limits itself to  applying to 
the state the ethical ideal o f the lim itation of its power, to  the hidrance of hin--
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drance of liberty, which according to  Kent is the ideal form  of law being m o­
rality applied to  external acts, and the constitutional ideal of dem ocratic legi­
slation and subordination*of executing government to laze. Kant however, 
restricts political right to  the class o f independent citizens - the bourgeois- 
and only gradually the dem ocratic ideal succeeds in universalizing political 
citizenship.
K ant himself, however, only justified gradual reform ation and rejected any 
form  o f revolution) against the powers tha t be. A t the basis of this theory 
there remains the idealistic ethical principle o f hum an liberty as moral au to­
nom y in the most absolute sense, which in F ichte’s first period is accentua­
ted into absolute individualism. It may be worthwhile to  summarize the steps 
of Kant’s descent from  this ethical ideal to  the theory  of the dem ocratic legal 
state in its formal period on the continent o f Europe - a descent which is it­
self the essence of formality. Thuswise - the form  of moral legality in gene­
ral which characterizes the categorical imperative o f ethics is the bridge be­
tween pure practical reason and the phenom enal reality of nature in human 
life, the form o f liberty in the relation of m utual freedom of choice in society 
is the bridge between right according to  pure practical laws of reason and em ­
pirical social life, and the form  o f the dem ocratic general will is the bridge 
between this idea o f  justice and the positive law o f the civil state.
The judgem ent o f  pure practical reason as to  the justice of external acts (i e 
m orality on its external side) is thus declared to  be essence of positive law - 
“ eine blosz empirische Rechtslehre ist (wie der holzerne Kopf in Phadrus’ 
Fabel) ein K opf der schon sein mag, nur schade, dazz er kein gehirn h a t” . But 
this essence is so formal, this rem nant o f natural law so attenuated, th a t it 
only am ounts to  the sanctioning of force w ith a view to  hindering hindrances 
to  liberty o f choice in the coexistence of individuals in so far as such liberty 
of choice can coexist with like liberty of every one else according to  a ge­
neral law of freedom. Valid law and right is materially only constituted by the 
force of the general will, though derived from  the formal ideal of individual 
liberty in external acts as based on moral liberty of selfdeterm ination.
A fter Kant on the continent a reaction set in against individualism and in 
this developm ent the general will was m etam orphosed by rom anticism  and 
historicism in to  the national mind as the source of all law. This national mind 
was at first represented as personified in the historically developed state and 
Hegel idealised the state itself as the moral personality o f hum anity and as 
such supreme.
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Later on even idealism itself was replaced by sociological positivism which 
saw as the moving power behind the state the socio-economic forces working 
in the historic developm ent o f society and by the Marxian socialism this idea 
was defined as tha t of the class struggle in which the ruling class necessarily 
dom inates society by its power and uses the state as the instrum ent o f its power. 
By the dialectical developm ent o f  history however the ruling class o f the time, 
the bourgeois capitalists, was according to  this view destined to be overthrown 
by the proletarian class o f labourers.
National socialism again is a com bination o f this theory with nationalistic 
historicism and issues in the view th a t the power behind the throne is the so­
cializing race basis o f nationality.
These theories are opposed to  those of the legal state, which dom inated the 
scene during the 19th century, as theories o f the power state. But even in 
these theories the ideal o f liberty and equality survives though in a socilized 
form, in Marxism in an egalitarian society, in national-socialism in an orga­
nic society.
But let us return to  the theory o f the legal state in its second or formal period 
which dom inated the scene in the middle o f 19th century.
The positivistic or formal period on the continent
In this period tw o results had been achieved as a consequence of jusnatura- 
listic and ethical speculation and revolutionary practice, viz (1) in the do­
main of private law the idea of equality in private rights of the private person 
as such, no privileges nor slavery and no distinction o f race, creed or natio­
nality, and (2) in the domain o f public law the abolition o f all feudal relations 
of a public nature including guild organisation and a clear distinction of le­
gislature, adm inistration and judicature with relatively dem ocratic represen­
tation in the legislature and th e  supremacy o f parliam entary law.
On the o ther hand the idea that the private person as such could have any 
legal right as against the state as lawgiver was made impossible by the theo­
ry th a t all law is positive and state-produced, while the various social groups 
and organizations (excluding political parties) had no t yet been recognized 
as clothed with any original rights or legal capacity, but were considered as 
creatures o f the state and its law, as far as their legal status was concerned.
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It was expected that the representative legislature should guarantee all private 
and social rights.
Consequently all emphasis was laid on the desideration o f formal legality 
in all state action and the supremacy o f dem ocratic legislation as a guarantee 
of individual liberty is so far as historicism and positivism did not content 
itself with declaring the supremacy of the historically evolved state power 
or accepting as legally binding all tha t the state as such decreed. Pure posi­
tivism, however, was a later growth which culminated in Kelson’s identifica­
tion o f state and law.
F.J. Stahl eg.,writing in the first half of the 19th century, still considered law 
as a second-rate social m orality characterized by force, restrictiveness and 
externality, yet nevertheless as essentially objective ethos. As such, however, 
it was necessarily imperified and even its justice not above reproach: law is 
in a sense bad but certain m orality , and thus even in its positivity no t neces­
sarily good justice. Further, law is social m orality as form ed by a nation in 
a state and thus only applicabel to  those acts of individuals which affect the 
nation with reference to  the external fashion o f social life.
Law as social m orality regulates the social existence of the individual, of the 
family, o f local communities, corporations and orders, o f the state and the 
com m unity of states and of the church. As such it is in a sense determined 
by the social structure and restricted by its own externality; it is further re­
stricted by its purpose of guaranteeing rights to  the individual in society, so 
tha t public adm inistration which has a wider purpose than law, is in part ex- 
trajural. Law and the state do not correspond completely, yet law is positive 
and positive law is w hat the stae commands though it be immoral and unjust 
and though the state may administratively act outside law itself. Formally 
positive law is always binding. Law may, however, also originate from  the 
historical background o f the state, viz the volkgeist—i.e. common or customary 
law.
There are individual and social moral determ inants of law, but positive law 
which also regulates a part o f state action is freely created by the nation and 
state* as such. For the state is no organism or corporation but the authorita­
tive moral self-expression o f the nation. As such it is determ ined by the moral 
personality o f the nation and its laws, but the state itself is the incarnation 
o f this moral personality as the king is the personification of the state. Con­
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sequently the state is the supreme guardian of external or social morality by 
means of positive law. Thus morally the state ought to  be a legal state.
On the other hand the state is the formally supreme dispenser o f the law, the 
legal guaranties of its legality can only be internal to  itself, a result o f its own 
character and constitution; outside of the state there is no basis for legal outo- 
nom y because all social groupings are part o f the state. Formally the state is 
the sovereign lawgiver o f formal law which has an outw ard sanction though 
not necessarily an inward vadility.
So the form  of the state and the staic action acquires supreme importance 
with a view to  ensuring its legality. N ot w hat it guarantees to  the individual or 
society, is im portant or rather decisive for its legality, but how it acts in forming 
its guarantees and sanctions, in which the main points are the form  o f the legis­
lature and the circumscription o f adm inistration by law, al though Stahl also 
posits a m ysterious interaction between national mind, sovereign state will and 
law in determing the  constitution of the sta te  and the character of its law.
Stahl also differentiates between judicature and adm inistration in tha t the first 
has as its main purpose maintaining the right o f individuals and groups (justice), 
while the la tte r aims at the common good within the limits o f law and right. 
Both are determ ined by law, but in the second case rather as by an outward 
fence — this being a reminiscence o f the so-called Polizeistaat in Germany. And 
in any case there is no appeal from  the Adm inistration to  a court o f law even 
on a point o f law, but only from  a lower A dm inistration au thority  to a higher, 
except in the m atter o f criminal punishm ent which in fact is a question of 
adm inistration but is closely connected with individual right th a t it can only 
be based on the sentence of a court o f law. So there are also certain private 
rights which are exem pted from  adm inistrative interference, such as a real 
property, paternal power, etc. However, in the case of conflict between jud i­
cature and adm inistration and for certain other purposes a special administrative 
court may be required. But the legislature itself is free from  legal restraints.
Still, in the form  of constitutional m onarchy it incorporates o r personifies 
the national mind and thus is itself potentially determ ined by law which as 
political ethos is a product o f the national mind. Later theorists in this move­
m ent more especially developed the idea o f self-government and the extension 
o f adm inistrative judicature and combined this w ith the gradual socialisation 
o f  law
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This development revealed the conflict between liberalism and dem ocratism 
in the theory o f the legal state — liberty versus equality — Locke versus Rous­
seau, especially in the developm ent o f the theory in France.
Of this further development little need be said except to  point out how the 
theory of the legal state was further formalized into pure dem ocratism  and 
legalism, until finally the state was considered a result o f sociological forces 
in a material and formal sense, and was declared to be a legal state however 
constituted by these forces — in as much as all states and any state must neces­
sarily issue in law. This final developm ent: consequently destroyed the idea 
of the legal state as a special kind of ideal state in as much as is declared all 
states equally to  be legal states, in this respect revealing a retrogression even 
as against the theory of the power state which at least retained an ideal of 
socialization.
Let us, however, briefly return to  the later development in the second period 
of the legal state before its final dissolution.
STATE SOVEREIGNTLY IN MODERN GERMANY BY EGGERSON
In this theory a certain legal autonom y of the nation and social groups or of 
society is recognised bu t this autonom y is not juridically (legally) based on 
the essential nature o f  these group forms, but on their will as sanctioned by 
the state in its recognition of custom as a source of law and in its sanction of 
statu tes and regulations of corporations in so far as not opposed to  the public 
interest as interpreted by the state and its laws. The state remains legally su­
preme and produces formal law of its own free will though in material inter­
action with national and social forces, and all that remains for the ideal of the 
legal state as a restraint upon arbitrariness is the constitution of the state on a 
socially representative basis and the testing o f adm inistrative acts according 
to  the law of the legislature by an independent judicature, w ithout any clear 
recognition of the special principles of adm inistrative justice.
At the background o f the law-producing power of the state and other authori­
ties thfere still remains the ideal of social necessities and interests which consti­
tu te  centres o f jural personality as bearers o f rights (and duties), individual 
personality as well as social personality, w ith the state as the all-embracing 
and consecuently supreme personality.
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The state ideally considered is the supreme conciliator o f social interest conflicts 
and is materially determ ined by this conciliation in its nature as a legal state; 
yet nevertheless law itself positively considered is the free product of the state 
and adm instration is the free pursuit of the public good within the limits o f the 
law. The state integrates society into harm ony by limiting itself to  legality by 
means of its constitutional balance of powers and adm inistrative adjudication.
With growth, however, o f  pure positivism in a sociological sense the conclus­
ion could hardly be evaded tha t the state is no more than the product o f society 
though it may finally be considered as a juristic person and even as a supreme 
juristic person and thus as the formal source o f supreme law in which it defines 
its own com petence and limits itself to  legal forms in all its activities. The 
legal state then becomes merely the state, any state, as determ ined by fixed rules 
o f its own making to  which it binds itself in all its functioning. Law sinks to  a 
mere form in which the juristic personality o f the  state manifests its supremacy, 
and from  this there is only one step to  the concept tha t the state is identical 
w ith law, so tha t any state necessarily is a legal state — the extrem e positivistic 
relativism in the theory of the state and the  law as expounded by Kelsen.
While the liberalism of Locke had been replaced by the dem ocratism of Ros- 
seau towards the end o f the first period, now the sociological insight into the 
dangers of dem ocratic tyranny in the party system and the pressure o f interest 
groups caused by revulsion from  dem ocratism to constitutionalism  and rule 
of law and from  tha t to  pure relativistic legalism, as against the frank return 
to  socialistic or nationalistic power politics, in fact the socialistic approach 
has welnigh destroyed the conception o f individual private rights from  which 
the theory o f the legal state set out.
The decline of the theory o f  the legal state — negative and positive criticism 
o f the hum anistic theory.
In the final period o f the theory o f the legal state towards the second half o f 
the nineteenth century the process o f its self-destruction is completed. Its basic 
ideal o f individual sovereignty o f  the human personality which had in its first 
stage generated the idea of private right o f liberty against the state and of 
popular sovereignty in legislation within the state, had in the second period 
been transform ed into the ideal o f the national mind which expresses itself 
in law and right and em bodied itself in the state as the creator o f positive law 
according to  national genius, which law itself is the gaurantee of justice and 
as such must be judicially m aintained against the adm inistration by independent
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courts o f justice. Now, however, in the third period positive sociology in the 
world of theory and socialism in the world of practice had exposed the state as 
the mere reflection o f social power relations w ithout an inner ideal content of 
individual or national personality and personal right, and law as the regularisa- 
tion of these power relations.
So private right is changed from a state-free sphere of right into a fortuitous 
law-free sphere of life in society which is hedged out by social solidarity as its 
continually issues in law and legal duty; >and popular sovereignty is metam or­
phosed into the socially determined despotism of the majority which is always 
right only because there is no absolute right any more; and the legal determ i­
nation o f  justice as well as the judicial lim itations of administrative discretion, 
the purely formal gaurantees of legal right, are constantly whittled down by 
the urgent pressure of social necessities. The theory of the legal state then 
finally successively retreats into the defensive position of state law as a means 
or formal category of social culture, of law as the self expression o f the state 
as juristic personality pass excellence, or at least as one of the many social per­
sonalities, of law and state as identical normative systems guaranteed as legal 
by the special scientific m ethod of their construction w ithout any relation to 
social reality and all the ethnical-political postulates o f outdated  humanism
— Ahrens, Damstaedter, Jellinek, Kelsen).
Yet nevertheless meanwhile a new conception of the legal state has arisen, 
which is based on the material right o f various natural and historic social groups. 
This furnishes a basis for a positive criticism of the humanistic theory. The 
vitium originis o f this theory is the humanistic concept tha t human reason or 
will is the sovereign source of all positive law, which leads to  the conclusion 
tha t there can be no positive right against the sovereign will and tha t law is 
only formally determined by its origin from  the sovereign will and thus w ith­
out material legal content, although it may be determined in its content by 
external forces, economic, psychological, biological or what not. The question 
then only is where will the sovereign will is found or how it is constituted, 
whether it is localized in the individual or the state or several social groups 
or according to  the laws of social development of the moment.
As against this concept Calvinism adheres to  the conviction tha t law is m ate­
rially determined by the Creator o f the Universe and in principle revealed in 
Scripture and in nature and society as historically developed, and formally 
promulgated by various social authorities, by each according to  its destination 
and nature, and that the state is not the source o f all positive law but only of
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state law (public and social and private) and that its law is determined by its 
destination and nature as the only m aintainer o f law and right by means of the 
organized force o f the territorial com m unity which is based on nationality in 
m odem  times.
It is the maintainer o f private law which is based on the jural needs of the 
individual as such in his relation with o ther individuals as such, it is the inte­
grator o f  social law according to  the principle o f the jural needs of national 
hom ogeneity on the basis o f the destination and nature of the several social 
groups of natural and historic origin, it is the form ulator of public law for the 
national state in its relation with o ther states on the basis of the historical 
destination o f the particular sta te and the nature of the state as such.
From  this it follows tha t the legal or jural state must be so organized tha t 
it can best form ulate state law in accordance w ith its nature and the needs 
o f the com m unity, tha t it can in terpret law impartially according to  the right 
o f the individuals and the internal au thority  o f the several social groups and tha t 
it can maintain the needs of social justice by the force of the com m unity ac­
cording to  the exigencies o f public force.
Accordingly the legislature m ust represent the nation in its unity  and its diver­
sity (by the incorporation o f social groups in advisory capacity), the judicature 
m ust be impartially constituted but so as to  be fair w ith all social needs and 
the executive must combine authority  with expertise and universality. In this 
connection the work of the judicature is o f supreme im portance as the inter­
preter of law and executive regulations, so as to  save the autonom y of the 
individual and the  social groups as against the demands o f national unity 
and public order in the application o f private and social law and vice versa of 
administrative law as such. This task can only be accomplished by clearly dif­
ferentiating the several cosmological laws which qualify the autonom y of all 
hum an activities — according to  their several functions.
If the state through its judicature or otherwise fails in this duty  of realizing 
formal law on the basis o f supra-voluntary right, its acts are not only unjust 
but stricdy illegal, and although no power within the state is justified in using 
force against it, every individual and every social group of cosmological autho­
rity  is entitled to  disregard its dictates as contrary to  law even if clothed in 
all the forms o f law. And in fact such dictates sooner or later prove their own
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illegality by causing chaos instead of order, as not being capable or regulating 
social intercourse.
The state in forming its own law thus is not free to establish this arbitrarily, but 
just as all o ther social groups are determined by their essential nature in estab­
lishing their internal laws, so the state only produces law in the strict sense 
when it realizes its own essential nature in correlation with the other group 
forms within it and the individuals in their interrelation as such. This law may 
also be more or less righteous as judged by the idea of right, but tha t does not 
in full affect its legality. Besides, the state in constituting itself by constitu­
tional law is bound to  the present historical basis of its being, viz. the political 
organization of the nation, which when the established state is shifted off 
this basis rises into statehood by assimilating to itself the political force of the 
com munity, and this is legal revolution.
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